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I.  Introduction 
 
As the East Asian economic crisis has unfolded over the last six months, it has 
become common place for informed Western commentators to suggest that the crisis 
has essentially been caused by the specific model of capitalism -- the so-called “Asian 
model”-- that these countries had been following.  It is admitted that this model had 
been quite successful in delivering fast economic growth for some time, but it is 
suggested that it was ultimately doomed to failure because of its incompatibility with 
free markets.  These points are made stridently by Richard Hornik in an article in the 
popular Time magazine. 
 
“NEWS FLASH -- THE LAW OF GRAVITY DOES APPLY IN ASIA.  For 
the past decade or two, Japan and then a succession of its East Asian 
neighbours had us convinced that they were exempt from conventional 
economic constraints.  The proof: year after year of high growth with minimal 
inflation.  Contravening all known wisdom of economic management, they did 
it with lots of direction from government bureaucrats -- who regularly 
outguessed the markets in developing efficient industries.  The dawn of an 
Asian Century was upon us, and pundits struggled to explain this miracle. 
 
….  For it is the top-down nature of the Asian model itself that is the real 
cause of the crisis.  This model bred complacency, cronyism and corruption.  
Isolated from public opinion, just as they insulated bankers and businessmen 
from market forces, the technocrats ignored the deafening clamour of alarm 
bells that market forces have been ringing for years…..  The financial crisis 
facing Asia today is merely a symptom of a much deeper problem.  The social 
and political assumptions on which the Asian model was founded are terribly 
outdated.  The global economy is far too complex and fast paced for any 
bureaucrats to control.  The only miracle in Asia is that this approach worked 
as long as it did.”1 
                                                          
1
 Time magazine, December 8, 1997. 
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The distinguished Financial Times journalist Sir Samuel Brittan adopts basically the 
same position, only a little less stridently: “I am not arguing that the growth of east 
Asian countries is over.  On the contrary, growth is likely to resume after the present 
adjustments.  What is over is the so-called ‘Asian model’ as a system of organisation 
that western countries should either fear, or attempt to emulate.”2 
 
This causal linking of the financial crisis in the South-East and East Asian 
countries to the ‘Asian model’ of capitalism is not just confined to distinguished 
financial journalists and popular commentators, but is a view endorsed by leading 
policy-makers.  Thus, Mr. Greenspan, the cautious chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, in his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
suggested that, in the last decade or so, the world has observed “a consensus towards, 
for want of a better term, the Western form of free-market capitalism as the model 
which should govern how each individual country should run its economy…We saw 
the breakdown of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the massive shift away from central 
planning towards free market capitalist types of structures.  Concurrent to that was the 
really quite dramatic, very strong growth in what appeared to be a competing 
capitalist-type system in Asia.  And as a consequence of  that, you had developments 
of types of structures which I believe at the end of the day were faulty, but you could 
not demonstrate that so long as growth was going at 10 percent a year.”3 Mr. Larry 
Summers, the U.S Treasury Under Secretary puts the matter in slightly different terms.   
The Financial Times (February 20, 1998) reports him as arguing that the roots of the 
Asian financial crisis lie not in bad policy management but in the nature of the 
economies themselves.  Summers states: “(this crisis) is profoundly different because 
it has its roots not in improvidence but in economic structures.  The problems that 
must be fixed are much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the 
private sector more and the public sector less.” Similar views have been expressed 
perhaps in more measured terms by the Managing Director of the IMF, Mr. Michel 
Camdessus.
4
 
 
In view of these widely held and influential criticisms of the Asian model by 
those who favour that of the Anglo Saxon one, a central aim of this paper will be to 
systematically assess the validity of this thesis, i.e., the paper will explore to what 
extent, if any, the so-called ‘Asian model’ is responsible for the present crisis in 
countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea.  This question is important in 
part because in economic terms until very recently this model seems to have been 
exceptionally successful.  It is no exaggeration to say that the industrialisation and 
economic development of  the Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), as well as 
Japan in the post-World War II period, has been the most successful example of fast 
economic growth in history.  Further, and very importantly in the context of this 
paper, the ‘Asian model’, in addition to its economic merits, has also had a number of 
attractive qualities from a social point of view, e.g. poverty reduction, lifetime 
employment and  relatively equal income distribution.  In contrast, the alternative 
Western or American model has acquired some  unappealing social characteristics as 
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 Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1998. 
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it is increasingly based on the doctrine of promoting labour market flexibility.  Social 
protection which hitherto workers enjoyed is being greatly diminished and a growing 
number of jobs are being “informalised.”5 
 
In view of the economic and social merits of the Asian model, it is important 
to ask whether the model also entailed some long run hidden costs. Was it, for 
example likely to lead to the kind of crisis which descended suddenly and almost 
simultaneously on several of the hitherto highly successful economies.  Such an 
analysis will obviously involve, inter alia, an assessment of other factors which may 
have been responsible for the crisis. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section II reports on the economic and 
social achievements of the leading East Asian NICs and of the Asian model over the 
last three to four decades.  As we shall see, Joseph Stiglitz, former Chairman of the 
US Council of Economic Advisers and now Chief Economist at the World Bank, is 
quite right to observe that “no other economic model has delivered so much, to so 
many, in so short a span of time.”  Section III outlines the essential characteristics of 
the Asian model.  These have been the subject of an intense debate in the past, but as 
will be shown below, current events appear to be leading to a consensus on the broad 
contours of the system.  Sections IV examines alternative theories of the current 
financial crisis, paying particular attention to the idea that the Asian economic system 
itself is the main cause of the financial turmoil.  Section V reviews the evidence 
bearing on these issues.  Section VI analyses the IMF policy programmes in East Asia 
including, inter alia, the extent, if any, to which these may have contributed to the 
crisis.  Section VII considers the economic and social consequences of the adjustment 
efforts and also draws lessons from the Latin American experience, and that of 
Mexico in particular, regarding the duration of the crisis and the effects of adjustment.  
Section VIII sums up the analytical conclusions of the paper and comments on their 
policy implications. 
 
 
II. Industrialisation and Catch-up in Asia, 1955-1995            
The Asian model of “guided” capitalist development originated in and is epitomised 
by the post World War II experience of Japan, especially in the high growth period 
between 1950 and 1973. In the early 1950s, after the economy had recovered from the 
war and at the end of the period of U.S. occupation, the Japanese economic situation 
was not much different from that of a developing country. The total value of Japanese 
exports in 1952 was less than that of India’s (Krueger, 1995);  exports consisted 
mainly of textiles and other labour intensive products. In 1955, Japan produced only 5 
million tons of steel and 30,000 automobiles. U.S. production at that time was 90 
million tons of steel and nearly 7 million cars. Japan possessed few natural resources 
for producing steel or other heavy industrial products, and indeed the Japanese costs 
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of producing steel were at that time considerably greater than the prevailing world 
prices. Nevertheless, disregarding short term comparative advantage and against 
almost all economic advice, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
deliberately encouraged and orchestrated the development of heavy industry in Japan.  
The rest is history. By the mid-1960s, Japan emerged as the lowest cost steel producer 
in the world and was outselling the U.S. steel industry in the U.S. itself.  By early 
1970, it was producing as much steel as the U.S.  By 1975, Japan had overtaken 
Germany as the largest exporter of automobiles in the world. By 1980, Japan 
produced more automobiles than the US.  Looking back on this phenomenal growth, it 
is that this incredible catch-up occurred over the relatively short span of 30 years.  
 
One might argue that Japan was a special case because it had been undergoing 
industrialisation since the Meiji Restoration in 1870. However, S.Korea, which 
consciously followed the Japanese economic strategy was unequivocally backward in 
industrial development in the 1950s. In 1955 Korea’s per capita manufacturing output 
was only $US 8 compared with $US 7 in India and $US 60 in Mexico.
6
  Less than 
four decades later, Korea has become an industrially developed economy. It competes 
with advanced economies in a wide range of industrial products. Next to the U.S., it is 
the second most important country in the world in electronic memory chip technology 
(DRAM). By the year 2000, Korea was expected to become  the fourth largest 
producer of automobiles in the world.  
 
The Japanese and S.Korean development models have been followed to 
varying degrees in Taiwan Province of China and Singapore but, more significantly, 
also in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.  There are important differences in aspects 
of industrial strategy followed by these five countries compared with that of Japan and 
Korea. The second group of countries have, for example, relied much more on FDI 
compared with the first group. Nevertheless, all these countries have followed the 
basic model of guided capitalist development rather than relying on free competitive 
markets.  
 
The outstanding economic success of this group of East and South East Asian 
countries, together with Hong Kong, is widely acknowledged. These countries have 
been able to industrialise quickly and grow very fast over the last three decades (see 
Tables 1 & 2). Indeed, since 1980, this part of the world has emerged as the most 
dynamic region in the world economy ( Table 1). Between 1980 - 1995, developing 
East Asia was growing at three times the rate of growth of the international economy.  
 
Significantly, fast growth was accompanied by low inflation as is indicated by 
the data for the affected Asian countries in Tables 3.  Moreover, World Bank (1993) 
notes “… For the eight HPAEs (high performing Asian economies), rapid growth and 
declining inequality (in income distribution) have been shared virtues, as comparisons 
over time of equality and growth using Gini coefficients illustrate.”7 In addition, as 
Stiglitz rightly emphasises, one of the most important achievements of Asian 
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countries during this period was an enormous reduction in poverty.  Stiglitz (1998a)  
observes:  “In 1975, six out of 10 Asians lived on less than $1 a day. In Indonesia, the 
absolute poverty rate was even higher. Today, 2 out of 10 East Asians are living in 
absolute poverty. Korea, Thailand and Malaysia have eliminated poverty and 
Indonesia is within striking distance of that goal. The USA and other western 
countries, which have also seen solid growth over the last 20 years but with little 
reduction in their poverty rates, could well learn from the East Asian experience.”8 
Indonesia’s success in reducing poverty is particularly remarkable. In 1970, 60% of 
the population was living below the official poverty line. By 1996, the proportion had 
fallen to 12%, while during this period the population had increased from 117 to 200 
million. (IMF Survey 16 August 1997.)  Table 5 shows changes in social indicators of 
development for selected ASEAN countries between 1970 and 1994.  
 
There is still further evidence which suggests that these high performing 
economies, most of which were working under some versions of the Asian model, not 
only achieved fast growth for the last three decades but that this growth was widely 
shared.  Between 1980 and 1992, real wages in the fast growing Asian NICs rose at a 
rate of 5 per cent a year, whilst at the same time employment in manufacturing 
increased by 6 per cent a year.  Some of these hitherto labour surplus economies 
began to experience a labour shortage and imported labour from neighbouring 
countries.  Overall, in South East and East Asia, there was a vast improvement in the 
standards of living of literally hundreds of millions of people, especially if China is 
also included in this group of countries.
9
  
 
The above highly positive East Asian record stands in striking contrast to that 
of large parts of the developing world in the recent period.  In relation to Latin 
America, for example, ILO (1995) reports that during the 1980 and the early 1990s 
there was a steady fall in modern sector employment, with paid employment falling at 
a rate of 0.1 per cent a year.  This reversed the trend of the previous three decades, 
when steady economic growth had led to a significant expansion of modern-sector 
employment.  As will be seen later, there has been a huge “informalisation” of the 
labour force in Latin America since the debt crisis of the early 1980s, that is, most 
new jobs that have been created during the last fifteen years are low quality, informal 
jobs paying low wages.  The average real wage in manufacturing in 1995 was still 
below its pre-debt crisis level, (See section VII, below). 
 
III. The East Asian Model 
Before any causal connection can be established between the Asian model of 
capitalism and the current financial crisis in the South East and the East Asian 
countries, it is important to be clear about the precise  nature of this model of 
development. In this connection it is interesting to observe that, in the 1990s, the 
international financial institutions’ (IFIs) theses -- specifically the World Bank’s -- 
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9
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East Asian model. See further, Nolan (1995) and Singh (1996a). 
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concerning (a) the basic characteristics and (b) the effectiveness of the Asian model 
have undergone a number of distinct changes. 
 
At the first stage, in a seminal contribution,
10
 World Bank (1991) claimed the 
East Asian countries were successful because they followed a “market-friendly” 
strategy of development and integrated their economies closely with that of the world 
economy. In order for the term not to be a mere tautology, the Bank’s economists to 
their credit defined “market-friendly” in a fairly precise way as follows: (1) “intervene 
reluctantly”, i.e. the government should intervene in economic activity only if the 
private sector is unable to do the tasks required; (2) interventions should be subject to 
checks and balances, and (3) interventions should be transparent. This characterisation 
essentially suggested a “night watchman” state, the main task of which was to provide 
the legal framework and the infrastructure necessary for private enterprise to flourish.  
 
These propositions concerning the East Asian economies could not however 
be sustained as they were greatly at variance with facts. Critics pointed out that all the 
evidence suggested that the governments in countries like Japan and Korea did not 
“intervene reluctantly”. Rather they pursued a vigorous industrial policy, the basic 
purpose of which was to change the matrix of prices and incentives facing private 
enterprise in the direction preferred by the planners. Similarly students of the subject 
pointed out that neither Japan or Korea for instance closely integrated their economies 
with the rest of the world. Although both countries were export-oriented, both of them 
made extensive use of selected import controls to protect specific industries.
11
 
Moreover both countries discouraged rather than promoted inward foreign investment. 
 
At the second stage, in response to these criticisms, in another seminal 
publication in 1993 (The East Asian Miracle), World Bank economists significantly 
changed their characterisation of the  East Asian model. The fact of enormous 
government interventions in these economies was now fully acknowledged. The 
World Bank (1993) stated: 
 
Policy interventions took many forms - targeted and subsidised credit to 
selected industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to 
increase profits and retained earnings, protection of domestic import 
industries, the establishment and financial support of government banks, 
public investment in applied research, firm- and industry-specific export 
targets, development of export marketing institutions, and wide sharing of 
information between public and private sectors. Some industries were 
promoted while others were not. 
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Nevertheless, the Bank argued that, although the government intervened heavily, these 
interventions were neither necessary nor sufficient for the extraordinary success of the 
East Asian countries. The World Bank (1993)concludes: 
 
What are the main factors that contributed to the HPAE’s superior allocation 
of physical and human capital to high yielding investments and their ability to 
catch up technologically? Mainly, the answer lies in fundamentally sound, 
market-oriented policies. Labour markets were allowed to work. Financial 
markets … generally had low distortions and limited subsidies compared with 
other developing economies. Import substitution was … quickly accompanied 
by the promotion of exports. … the result was limited differences between 
international relative prices and domestic relative prices in the HPAE’s. 
Market forces and competitive pressures guided resources into activities that 
were consistent with comparative advantage … 
 
In other words it was suggested that, notwithstanding the facts of heavy government 
intervention in East Asian economies, the Bank’s traditional policy conclusions - that 
countries should seek their comparative advantage, get the prices right, have free 
markets as far as possible - are still valid.  
 
Now, in the wake of the current financial crisis in South-East Asia, the IMF in 
particular is suggesting that important characteristics of the East Asian model are 
dysfunctional.
12
 Especially singled out for criticism are: (a) the close relationship 
between government and business, and (b) various distortions to competitive markets. 
The relationships under (a) are regarded as creating crony-capitalism, leading to 
corruption and a myriad inefficiencies in resource allocation. The inference is that 
these countries should go back to the World Bank (1991) prescription of a “night 
watchman” state and an economy which is closely integrated with the world economy. 
 
The Bank’s critics vigorously dispute its theses on the lack of effectiveness of 
interventions in the East Asian economies.
12
 There is, however, now much greater 
agreement between the two sides on the broad description of the model as outlined in 
the first of the two quotations from World Bank (1993) above. Based on my own 
previous research and that of other scholars, there would be more or less agreement on 
the following characteristics of the East Asian model in its “ideal form”: 14  
 
1.  The close relationship between the government and business where the 
government does not do anything without consulting business and vice versa. 
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  As indicated earlier, the World Bank’s Chief Economist, Professor Stiglitz, takes a rather different 
view of the crisis than that of the Fund. However, as Wade & Veneroso (1998) suggest the position of 
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2.  Many interventions are carried out through a system of “administrative guidance” 
rather than through formal legislation.
 
 
 
3.  The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in countries like 
Japan and Korea has also been very different from that of the US and the UK. The 
former countries have followed, for example, the so-called main bank system 
which involves long-term relationships between the corporations and the main 
banks. This enables Japanese or Korean managers to take a long-term view in their 
investment decisions. The managers are not constrained by the threat of hostile 
take-overs on stock markets as is the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
4.  There are differences in the internal organisation of East Asian corporations 
compared with those of the US and the UK. The former involve co-operative 
relationships between management and labour, epitomised by the system of 
lifetime employment. This implies considerable imperfections in the labour 
market. 
 
5.  As for the competition in product markets, such competition is not regarded by the 
East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in countries like the US, 
economic philosophy in the East Asian countries does not accept the dictum that 
“the more competition the better.” The governments in these countries have taken 
the view that, from the perspective of promoting investment and technical change, 
the optimal degree of competition is not perfect or maximum competition. The 
governments have therefore purposefully managed and guided competition: it has 
been encouraged but also restricted in a number of ways.
15
  
 
6.  Following this basic economic philosophy outlined above, the East Asian 
governments have sought not “close” but what might be called “strategic” 
integration with the world economy i.e. they have integrated up to the point where 
it has been useful for them to do so. Thus during their high-growth, developmental 
phases, Japan (between 1950 - 1973) and Korea (1970s and 1980s) integrated with 
the world economy in relation to exports but not imports; with respect to science 
and technology but not finance and multinational investment. 
 
  As noted above, this is a characterisation of the East Asian model as an ideal type. 
Not all countries, or even Japan and Korea have followed the model exactly at all 
times in the post-war period.  As far as the government-business relationships are 
concerned there is a continuum with the closest relationship to be found in Korea, and 
the least close in Thailand.  Malaysia and Indonesia fall in between.  Similarly, the 
main bank system worked differently in Korea compared with Japan.  Unlike Japan, 
where the “main banks” were by and large private entities, in Korea for much of the 
period these were directly state-controlled.  Only in the recent period have they been 
privatised.  Nevertheless, there is considerable truth in the view that the Asian way of 
doing business and the institutional structures it has generated are considerably 
different from those of countries like the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
 9 
 
IV Causes of the Crisis 
 
Table 6 outlines the salient financial  facts concerning the crisis in the East and South 
East Asian countries during the last six months. In the worst affected country, 
Indonesia, the stock market has fallen by more than 80 per cent and  the exchange rate 
of the rupiah against the dollar by almost 75 per cent.  This implies that a foreign 
investor who invested $100 in a company quoted on the Indonesian stock market 
would have seen the value of his/her investment fall by 96 per cent during the half 
year. By the same token, it also means that if a foreign corporation had to pay $100 to 
acquire an Indonesian company in July 1997, it could in principle purchase it now for 
only $4. This is of course not just a theoretical possibility, but as Krugman (1998) 
notes, there is evidence of a “fire sale” of East Asian assets currently in progress in the 
wake of the financial crisis.
16
  The twin crises of the stock and currency markets have  
also resulted in corporate and financial sector bankruptcies with huge losses of 
production and jobs.  
 
Those who attribute the crisis to the failings of the Asian model suggest that, 
while there may have been various immediate triggers -- a property price bubble, 
macroeconomic mistakes (for example, supporting for far too long a nominally fixed 
exchange rate), a fall in the rate of growth of exports, or a regional contagion effect -- 
the underlying causes were structural and an integral part of the Asian model of 
capitalism.  The crisis manifested itself in the form of “overinvestment” (see further 
below), misallocation of foreign capital inflows, and severe problems in the financial 
sector.  The financial structure of the corporations and the banks, as well as other 
deficiencies of the state-guided or state-directed financial systems in Asian countries, 
made these economies very fragile. IMF (1997, p.14) points to the following specific 
structural weaknesses of the most affected economies. 
 
 In Korea, the industrial structure has been heavily influenced by government 
intervention, including, as well as directed credits, regulations and explicit or 
implicit subsidies. The resulting lack of market discipline has contributed to 
the problem of unproductive or excessive investment that has played a role in 
the build-up of the recent crisis.  
  
 In Indonesia, trade restrictions, import monopolies, and regulations have 
impeded economic efficiency and competitiveness, and reduced the quality 
and productivity of investment. 
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 In Thailand, political disarray at various times during 1996-97, including in the 
wake of the November 1996 general election, delayed the implementation of 
necessary policy measures.  In these and other cases, the power of special 
interests has often appeared to have had considerable influence on the 
allocation of budgetary resources and other public policy actions. 
  
 In a number of countries, uncertainty has been increased and confidence 
adversely affected  by inadequate disclosure of information and data 
deficiencies, particularly with regard to extra- budgetary fiscal transactions, the 
quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank, directed lending, the problem loans 
of financial institutions, official foreign exchange reserves and their 
management (including reserve-related liabilities), and private sector short-
term debt.  There has also often been a lack of transparency in policy 
implementation, such as with the decisions regarding public infrastructure 
projects and ad hoc tax exemptions. 
 
The failure of the Asian model thesis has powerful proponents including Mr. 
Greenspan, Mr. Summers and the IFIs. But it is by no means the only significant 
available  theory with respect to the financial crisis. Many Asian political leaders have 
put forward an entirely different perspective.  They are prone to blame the whole of 
the crisis on the activities of foreign speculators and reject the view that the crisis was 
essentially “home grown” ( to use the phrase of the I.M.F Deputy Managing Director, 
Mr. Stanley Fischer).   
 
A more sophisticated version of this “external factors” view is contained in the 
recent academic literature spawned by the Mexican crisis of 1994.
17
 These  
contributions, based on careful theoretical and empirical analyses, show that it is 
entirely possible for a financial crisis to occur even when a country’s fundamentals are 
totally sound. It may arise because of changes in investor sentiment or perceptions 
which may be triggered off entirely by external events such as changes in  interest 
rates or equity prices in advanced countries. Some of these theories suggest that such 
crises of confidence can be self-fulfilling prophecies. Other models use the analogy of 
the classic panic-induced run on the banks to describe the present financial crisis in 
East Asian countries.  
 
A third important theory ascribes the crisis to liberalisation of the global 
financial markets, and particularly to the deregulation of the capital account which 
many Asian countries had undertaken in the preceding period.  It is suggested that the 
latter was the main cause of the crisis rather than any structural factors connected with 
the Asian development model.  Indeed, it is argued that if these countries had 
continued to follow the Asian model of state-guided investment and state direction of 
the financial system, there would not have been a crisis at all in the first place. The 
crisis occurred directly as a result of  deregulation and liberalisation when the 
governments relinquished controls over the financial sector as well as corporate 
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investment activities. This led to misallocation (towards, for example, the property 
sector) of investment as well as overinvestment.  
 
As these theories are central in determining the choice of remedies for the 
crisis, it is clearly important to know which of them is more congruous with the facts.  
The events are too close to be able to provide anywhere near a definitive explanation 
of the crisis, but the following section will review the evidence.  
 
 
V.  Evidence on the Theories Concerning the Crisis 
 
  
The survey below of available evidence bearing on the alternative theories of the 
present financial crisis in South East and East Asian countries is organised around the 
following themes: 
(a) the role of fundamentals; 
(b) the proximate cause of the crisis – the capital supply shock; 
(c) the role of structural factors; and 
(d) financial liberalisation 
 
V.1.  Fundamentals 
The most important point to note here is that all the affected countries prior to the 
crisis had for a long time enjoyed strong “fundamentals.” This is evident from our 
earlier discussion in Section II and from the more detailed data presented in Tables 1-
3. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea had all recorded extraordinarily strong 
economic growth for many years; their inflation rates were usually in single figures 
and much below the developing country average. These countries also had high 
domestic savings rates, indeed considerably greater than those of other developing 
countries including Brazil, Mexico, and India (the three countries for which data is 
provided in Table 4 for comparative purposes.) 
 
Moreover, the crisis countries had healthy fiscal positions. The public sector 
finances were either in surplus or had small sustainable deficits. The fiscal position of 
these countries compared very favourably with the average of developing countries as 
well as with that of Brazil, Mexico, and India.  
 
A potentially significant blemish on this generally positive pre-crisis long-term 
economic record was the position of the current account balance in the some of the 
affected countries. Thailand and Malaysia have experienced huge current account 
deficits, which in the 1990s amounted to nearly 6.9 percent of GDP in the case of 
Thailand, and 6 percent of GDP for Malaysia.  In 1996 the Thai current account 
deficit was almost 8 percent of GDP while that of Malaysia had fallen to 4.9 percent. 
Nevertheless, it is also the case that both those countries had a relatively low debt 
service to exports ratios throughout the 1990s -- 4.5 percent for Thailand, and 6 
percent for Malaysia.  Furthermore, in the case of Malaysia, as Table 7 on external 
capital flows indicates, the high current account deficit was to a considerable extent 
financed by a strong net inflow of foreign direct investment. 
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The Korean current account deficit in 1996 was 4.9 percent of GDP, an 
unusually high figure for Korea. Korea was not however a persistent offender - its 
average deficit during the 1990s was less than 2 percent of GDP. The larger 1996 
deficit was caused by special circumstances, notably the collapse of prices of semi-
conductors of which Korea was a major exporter.  However, this sharp  increase in the 
current account deficit was a temporary phenomena, as one would expect from a 
highly diversified export-oriented economy. Indeed, in the last quarter of 1997 the 
Korean economy recorded a huge current account surplus of $3 billion. Indonesia’s 
current account deficit during the 1990s averaged 2.6 percent of GDP; in 1996 it was 
3.3 percent, an entirely sustainable figure on the past record of the economy. The only 
country where the current account deficit could be regarded as a real problem was 
Thailand. This is mainly because the deficit was being financed by bank borrowings 
(see Table 7). 
 
It is also relevant to observe that, as late as September 1997, the Korean debt 
had a high rating from western rating agencies.  Similarly, until almost the eve of the 
financial crisis in August 1997, the IMF was praising the Indonesian government for 
its successful management of the economy as well as for its achievements in reducing 
poverty. 
18
  
 
To sum up, all the affected Asian countries had strong “fundamentals” in the 
sense of a proven record of being able to sustain fast economic growth. In view of 
their export orientation, they also had the ability to service their debts in the long term. 
They did, however, suffer to varying degrees from short term imbalances such as 
overvalued exchange rates, as well as short term liabilities of the financial sector 
which exceeded the value of the central bank’s reserves. This required some 
macroeconomic adjustments and restructuring of debts. In other words, these 
countries had problems of liquidity rather than solvency. In this context Wolf’s (1998) 
observations concerning Indonesia are pertinent: 
 
Dwell for a moment, on Indonesia: its current account deficit was less 
than 4 percent of GDP throughout the 1990’s; its budget was in 
balance; inflation was below 10 percent; at the end of 1996 the real 
exchange rate (as estimated by J.P. Morgan) was just 4 percent higher 
than at the end of 1994; and the ratio to GDP of domestic bank credit 
to the private sector had risen merely from 50 percent in 1990 to 55 
percent in 1996. True, the banking system had mountains of bad debt, 
but foreign lending to Indonesian companies had largely bypassed it. 
 Is anyone prepared to assert that this is a country whose 
exchange rate one might expect to depreciate by about 75 percent? 
Some exchange-rate adjustment was certainly necessary; what 
happened beggars belief. 
 
V.2. The Capital Supply Shock 
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It is generally agreed that the proximate cause of the crisis in all the four affected 
countries was the capital supply shock – the sudden interruption and reversal of 
normal capital inflows into these economies.  Table 8, which provides aggregate 
financing figures for these countries plus the Philippines, indicates that their net 
external capital inflows more than doubled between 1994 and 1996 -- from a little 
over $40 billion to more than $90 billion. The latter figure greatly exceeded the 
combined current account deficits of these countries, allowing them to build sizeable 
reserves. In 1997, however, there was a huge capital supply shock: the net inflow of 
$93 billion in 1996 turned into a net outflow of $12 billion in  1997, a turnaround of 
$105 billion.  The latter figure is equivalent of 10 per cent of the pre-crisis GDP of 
these countries (Wolf (1997).  The decomposition of the capital inflows in Table 8 
suggests that the most volatile item was commercial bank lending which turned from 
a positive figure of over $50 billion in 1996 to a negative figure of $21 billion in 
1997.  
 
What the above evidence on the “fundamentals”, as well as the analysis of 
section II on the long-term supply-side capabilities of these economies suggests is 
that, whatever the trigger for the crisis (whether external macroeconomic imbalances 
or the liabilities of the financial institutions) the foreign commercial banks grossly 
over reacted, giving rise to a classic panic induced bank--run - with the difference that 
it is the external creditors who were withdrawing their funds (from, say, Thailand) 
before the country defaulted. Such behaviour on the part of the banks makes default or 
a major IMF bail-out a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
V.3. Structural Factors 
Turning to the “structural factors” connected with the Asian model, which the IMF 
and others implicate in the crisis, we  first consider the issue of “transparency.” It is 
suggested that, because of the nature of the Asian corporations (involving extensive 
cross-subsidisation of subsidiaries) and their close, non-arm’s length relationship with 
banks, and similar relationships between banks and governments, the markets did not 
have enough information about the true financial status of the corporations and the 
banks. This is regarded as being one important reason for the overreaction by the 
markets.
19 
 
 
However, in relation to this proposition, the following observations are 
relevant.  First, as Stiglitz (1998a) notes, following financial liberalisation there have 
been similar banking crises in the early 1990s even in the Scandinavian countries. 
These countries would be regarded by many as being at the top of any international 
transparency league: the availability of reliable information was evidently not 
adequate by itself to prevent financial panics.  Secondly, it is specifically claimed that 
international banks did not have accurate and timely information on the shortening 
maturity of bank claims on Asian countries.  This complaint is also controversial.  As 
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collapse of market confidence, with the IMF finally being authorised to intervene just days before 
potential bankruptcy.” 
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Professor Alexandre Lamfalussy, the former chief economist at the Bank of 
International Settlements noted in a recent letter to the Financial Times (February 13, 
1998):  
 
…the Bank for International Settlement is encouraged to speed up the 
publication of its statistics on international bank lending…The 
suggested improvement will surely do no harm but it will not do much 
good either as long as market participants and other concerned parties 
fail to read publicly available information or to draw practical 
conclusions from it. 
 
In the summer of 1996 the BIS reported in its half yearly statistics that 
by end-1995 the total of consolidated bank claims on South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia reached $201.6bn. It reported in 
January 1997 that by mid-1996 the figure rose to $226.5bn and six 
months later, that by end-1996 it reached $247.8bn – an increase of 23 
per cent in one year. For each of these dates the maturity breakdown 
was available. It was therefore known by mid-summer 1996 that bank 
claims maturing within one year made up 70 per cent of the total for 
South Korea, 69.4 per cent for Thailand, 61.9 per cent for Indonesia, 
but “only” 47.2 per cent for Malaysia. 
 
Professor Lamfalussy goes on to add: 
Moreover, in its Annual Report published on June 10 1996, the BIS 
did not hesitate to use strong words describing developments that had 
taken place already in 1995: ‘…By year end, Thailand had become the 
largest bank debtor in the developing world….  
 
Thirdly, in relation to this argument about transparency and information, it is also 
pertinent to note that international banks lent huge sums of money to merchant banks 
in South Korea.  Most of the latter did not have a long enough track record, being less 
than two years old (Chang 1998). Many would regard such lending practices to be 
highly imprudent, if not reckless. 
 
Turning to other structural features of the Asian model which it has become 
customary to blame for the crisis, we consider first the questions of overinvestment 
and misallocation of investment in countries like Thailand to the non-productive 
property sector. Here it is important to observe that if in the process of financial 
liberalisation, the governments of countries like Korea and Thailand had not eschewed 
control over their financial sector and corporate investment activity, such 
overinvestment and misallocation would not have occurred. It was therefore not the 
Asian model but the abandonment of one of its essential features which was directly 
responsible for the observed weaknesses that came to the fore. 
 
Another structural characteristic of the Asian model which is the subject of 
much adverse comment in orthodox analysis of the current crisis pertains to corporate 
finance.  As is well known, the typical corporation particularly in Japan, Korea, or 
Thailand is heavily geared, i.e. has a high ratio of debt to the equity capital of the 
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shareholders.  The Korean chaebol enterprises which spear-headed that country’s 
extraordinarily successful industrialisation drive and the continuous technological 
upgrading of its exports over the last three decades are typically family owned.  They 
are however very big – 11 South Korean companies are included in Fortune 
magazine’s top 500 in the world.  To put this figure into perspective, it may be useful 
to note that Switzerland, a far more developed economy, also has only 11 companies 
in the world’s top 500. 20 In order for the families to be able to own such huge 
corporations, the equity component of the total invested corporate capital tends to be 
small relative to debt. Table 9 shows the debt-equity ratios of leading Korean 
corporations. Table 10 provides a comparative analysis of the debt equity ratios of the 
largest quoted companies in nine emerging markets in the 1980s and 1990s.  It clearly 
indicates that the Korean companies are relatively very heavily geared with a median 
value of the debt to equity ratio of 4.3 between 1980 and 1994. However the bottom 
two parts of the Table indicate that between the early 1980’s and the early 1990’s, this 
fell from 5.48 to 3.96 . The Table also reveals that the Asian corporations, including 
those from India, have considerably higher debt-equity ratios than those of the Latin 
American corporations.   
 
However, the important point to note is that such corporate financial 
arrangements have been functional within the traditional Asian economic system.  
This is in part due to the continuous monitoring of the corporations by “main banks” 
with whom they have long term relationships, as well as to the close oversight by the 
government over the banks.  These arrangements were particularly useful during 
Korea’s industrialisation drive, as the corporations were induced by the government to 
enter into new technological areas involving huge risks. Left to themselves, the 
corporations may not have been able to undertake such risks, but with the government 
becoming in effect a co-partner through the banking system, such technological risks 
were “socialised”. Following the work of Williamson (1976), Lee (1992) has 
characterised this system as essentially constituting an internal capital market. In view 
of the well known weaknesses of free capital markets (e.g., a tendency towards short 
termism and quick profits) such an internal capital market may in fact be more 
efficient than the former.
21
  
 
However, such a corporate system became dysfunctional when, for example, 
in Korea the government undertook during the last few years a process of financial 
liberalisation (under pressure from the U.S. government and the IFI’s, but see the 
discussion in Section VIII).  Korea resisted allowing non-residents to buy majority 
stakes in its corporations.  However, its mistake was to implement other components 
of capital account liberalisation by permitting Korean companies and banks to raise 
money abroad without the traditional supervision and control.  So, in that sense, it was 
again financial de-regulation (i.e. the dismantling of a fundamental aspect of the 
previous system) which rendered the system dysfunctional and fragile. 
 
It is interesting in the above context to consider the case of India. As Table 10 
indicates, the Indian corporations are also very highly geared. Moreover India’s 
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Singh (1996b); Singh and Weisse (1998). 
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fundamentals, as Tables 3 and 4 (discussed earlier) suggest, were much weaker than 
those of the East Asian countries. Nevertheless, India has not had a financial crisis. At 
a time of deep turbulence in the currency markets of its South East and East Asian 
neighbours, the Indian currency market has been a model of stability. Why? Most 
observers would agree that the main reason for this is that India has rather limited 
capital account liberalisation. It does not allow its corporations or banks to borrow or 
lend capital abroad without government approval. It has carried out some 
liberalisation by allowing non-residents to purchase shares directly on the Indian stock 
markets, but they cannot become majority shareholders. This limited, cautious 
openness, the relatively small size of foreign portfolio inflows as well as that of the 
stock market itself has been helpful to the Indian economy. The Indian currency is 
consequently much less vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment or speculative 
attacks from outside. 
 
VI. The IMF Policy Programme and the East Asian Crisis 
As the financial crisis deepened in East Asia during the last six months and more and 
more countries became involved, the IMF assembled large financial packages to bail 
out the affected countries. However this aid was available only in return for strict 
conditionality. Apart from their usual policies of demand restraint (cuts in money 
supply, high interest rates, fiscal retrenchment, etc.) the Fund went further. It 
recommended far-reaching changes in the economic and social systems of these 
countries. These changes included further liberalisation of the financial sector 
(including permitting hostile take-overs of domestic firms by non-residents); changes 
in the system of corporate governance, in labour laws, in government business 
relations, and in competition policy. Such measures were insisted on because it was 
believed (erroneously as we have seen above) that the root cause of the crisis was the 
“dirigiste” institutional structures and policies of these countries.  
   
Following the important work of the Chief Economist at the World Bank, Stiglitz 
(1998a, b), as well as that of leading independent economists, Sachs (1997), Feldstein 
(1998a, b), Wade and Veneroso (1998), Amsden and Euh (1997), Akyuz (1997), the 
difficulties with the IMF policy programmes may be summarised as follows : 
 
1. The institution’s traditional policy programme of demand restraint etc. is typically 
designed to deal with countries with persistent current account disequilibria, fiscal 
deficits, and over-heated economies. For the Asian economies, however, except 
perhaps to some extent for Thailand, the problem has been one of capital account 
disequilibrium rather than that of current account imbalances. Moreover, as we 
have seen earlier, the public sector finances in these countries (including Thailand) 
have been by and large in equilibrium and it is the private sector which is in severe 
disequilibrium. In these circumstances, the large fiscal austerity required by the 
IMF’s original programmes for these countries would have made matters worse 
rather than better, pushing the countries deeper into recession, and thereby 
exacerbating the private sector financial disequilibria.  
  
2. The high real interest rates entailed by the programmes are likely to greatly 
impede the private sector’s viability. Such rates may indeed lead to the bankruptcy 
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of a large part of the sector,  deepening the depression of the real economy. In 
response to this criticism, the IMF has argued that higher interest rates are required 
for restoring international confidence in the countries’ policies. Stiglitz’s (1998) 
counter argument  is that there is little empirical evidence to support the view that 
high interest rates improve confidence. He goes on to add that one could perhaps 
make a case for an increase in interest rates for a brief spell, but countries like 
Indonesia and Thailand have had real interest rates of 20 per cent or more now for 
nearly nine months.  
  
 There is some truth in both these contentions. Evidence from the financial crisis in 
the various parts of the world suggests that higher interest rates help before a crisis 
has occurred  (i.e. they may forestall the crisis) but once the crisis has taken place, 
increasing interest rates is often regarded by the market as a sign of weakness and 
is therefore counter productive.  
  
3. The international financial institutions (IFIs) are quite right to stress the 
importance of prudential regulation and supervision of the financial sector. 
Certainly, financial liberalisation by the affected countries without such 
regulations was a serious mistake. However, to forestall the crisis, the IFIs should 
have discouraged financial liberalisation by these countries until the appropriate 
regulatory regime was in place. This the institution did not do, presumably 
because of its own strong commitment to external  account liberalisation. Further, 
it is a moot point whether under  a regime of free capital flows, prudential 
regulation of the domestic financial sector, without that of international banks as 
well, would have been enough to prevent a financial crisis. [Akyuz (1997); Stiglitz 
(1998)].  
  
4. The misdiagnosis of the crisis by the IFIs (that it has been due to the dirigiste 
model of Asian capitalism rather than being caused by internal and external 
financial liberalisation) has had serious adverse consequences for the affected 
countries. It is certainly arguable that the IFIs’ emphasis on what was perceived to 
be the fundamental structural difficulties of the Asian model (crony capitalism, 
corruption etc.), panicked foreign investors still further, and thereby worsened the 
crisis [Feldstein, 1998 a, b].   
  
5. As the evidence outlined earlier (the strong fundamentals, the large inflows of 
private capital from abroad and IFIs’ approval of economic management of these 
countries until the eve of the crisis), suggests the East Asian crisis was originally 
one of liquidity rather than solvency. In these circumstances, it would have been 
preferable for the institutions to have acted as an intermediary to help bridge the 
gap between lenders and borrowers over the time profile of repayment. Instead, 
huge sums of money were raised for bail-outs and imposed far-reaching 
conditionalities on the crisis countries which could be interpreted as signalling a 
deeper crisis of insolvency rather than one simply of liquidity.  
  
6. Professor Feldstein [1998 a, b] makes an important point of political economy 
concerning the IMF programmes which deserves serious consideration by the 
international community. He notes that the IMF is an international agency whose 
purpose ought to be to provide technical advice and, as appropriate, the financial 
 18 
assistance necessary to help countries overcome a balance of payments crisis with 
as little loss of output and employment as possible. It may also wish to ensure that 
the country continues to follow the right economic policies so that, as far as 
possible, the situation does not re-occur. However, he suggests that the IMF 
“should not use the opportunity to impose other economic changes that, however 
helpful they maybe, are not necessary to deal with the balance-of-payments 
problem and are the proper responsibility of the country’s own political system.” 
 
Professor Feldstein proposes the following three-point test for the structural aspects of 
the IMF conditionalities:  
 
In deciding whether to insist on any particular reform, the IMF should 
ask three questions:  Is this reform really needed to restore the 
country’s access to international capital markets?  Is this a technical 
matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the proper jurisdiction 
of a sovereign government?  If the policies to be changed are also 
practised in the major industrial countries of Europe, would the IMF 
think it appropriate to force similar changes in those countries if they 
were subject to a fund program?  The IMF is justified in requiring a 
change in a client country’s national policy only if the answer to all 
three questions is yes. (Feldstein, 1998b) 
 
Unfortunately, Professor Feldstein suggests that the answers to none of the three 
questions above for S.Korea, for example, is in the affirmative.  The structural 
conditions imposed on S.Korea include fundamental changes in labour regulations, 
corporate governance, the relationship between government and business. These 
clearly involve deeply political matters. Moreover, few governments can deliver such 
reforms in a short space of time and this unnerves the markets, making the resolution 
of the crisis more difficult. 
 
 
VII. Economic and Social Consequences of the Adjustment Programmes. 
The adjustment programmes agreed with the IMF by the affected countries are likely 
to have serious economic and social consequences not only in the short term but also 
perhaps in the medium to long term. The IMF economists own estimates of the impact 
of the programmes would appear to be rather optimistic.  
 
VII.1  Short to Medium-Term Impact on Employment, Poverty and Ethnic 
Relations 
 
The IMF’s original projections (in December 1997) for GDP growth for 1998 for 
selected Asian countries are shown in Table 11.  These indicate that, apart from 
Thailand for which no growth is projected, the expected growth in affected countries 
will be 2 to 2.5 percent per annum.  Although for Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea this 
represents a sharp slow down from their long-term growth trajectory, there is still a 
positive growth rate. Table 12, however provides the composite average forecasts for 
GDP growth for 1998 by independent analysts - the investment banks Credit 
Lyonnais, HBSC James Capel and J. P. Morgan.  These suggest a deep depression for 
 19 
Thailand and Indonesia, and severe recession for Korea. The previous record of the 
Fund’s programmes in other countries  (see further the discussion on Latin American 
countries below) suggest that the composite  projections are more likely to be near the 
mark. 
22
  
 
What will be the social consequences for the crisis countries of the negative growth 
rates for 1998 as suggested by independent organisations?  Further, how long will it 
take for economic growth in these countries to reach the previous long-term levels? 
 
In relation to the first question, theoretical analysis and international evidence 
indicate that there would be significant effects in the following areas: 
 
 unemployment, underemployment and quality of jobs; 
 poverty and income distribution; 
 ethnic relations (in the case of some of the affected countries, there are 
special aspects relating to ethnic composition of the population and 
distribution of assets among ethnic groups which could have serious social 
and economic ramifications.) 
 
Moreover, in addition to reduced growth, adjustment will entail in the short term at 
least much higher inflation, as a consequence of currency depreciations.  Also the 
fiscal restraint introduced as part of the adjustment package is likely to  entail cuts in 
social expenditures such as health and education.  To the extent that the World Bank’s 
countermeasure to contain the social effects of the crisis are not fully effective, the 
impact of reduced growth on poverty and income distribution is likely to be 
compounded.  Unemployment, poverty, worsening income distribution and rising 
prices could in turn all generate ethnic tensions. 
 
As it is still an unfolding crisis, hard evidence on the full social dimensions 
will not be available for some time.  The Financial Times reported at the end of last 
year (December 10, 1997, p. 4) enormous job losses throughout Asia, and even in 
countries that just months earlier were experiencing labour shortages.  The Thai 
government estimates job losses will total about 1.5 million by the end of 1998; in 
Korea these are expected to be nearly a million.  Similarly, labour unions in Indonesia 
expect unemployment in that country to rise by one million by the end of 1998 (ILO 
1998). 
 
These could well turn out to be optimistic numbers in view of the expected 
decline in economic growth and of the uncertainty as to how long slow growth will 
continue.  The main determinants of aggregate employment and poverty in developing 
countries are the trend rate of economic growth and of inflation.  As we saw earlier, 
with high growth rates and low inflation, the Asian economies during the 1980s and 
1990s were able to achieve not only fast growth of employment but also rapidly 
growing real wages. In Latin America and Africa, on the other hand, despite falling or 
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sluggishness. The outcome will probably be worse’. 
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stagnant real wages, modern sector employment fell.  As there are no adequate social 
security systems in most developing countries, those who become unemployed in the 
formal sector are obliged to seek work in the informal sector regardless of how poorly 
remunerated or productive such work may be. In other words, what we find in poor 
countries is that reduced economic growth and reduced demand for jobs leads less to a 
rise in open employment but rather to a growth of disguised or informal sector 
employment. (This point is discussed further below.) 
 
Islam (1998) has made some admittedly rough estimates of the likely effects of 
reduced growth on unemployment in Indonesia in 1998.  His calculations are based on 
two alternative assumptions: (a) that the GDP growth rate in 1998 will be zero and (b) 
that the GDP growth rate will be minus 5 per cent.  On the basis of desegregated 
sectoral data, unemployment is expected to increase to approximately 7 million in 
1998 under assumption (a).  This is 7.4 per cent of the labour force compared to less 
than five per cent in 1996.  Under assumption (b), Islam projects an unemployment 
rate in 1998 of 8.8 per cent.  It will be noticed that these estimates of increased 
unemployment in 1998 are considerably higher than the estimates of the Indonesian 
trade unions quoted earlier.  However, Islam suggests that the open unemployment 
will turn out to be less than his estimates as a significant proportion of those  losing 
their jobs will enter the informal sector for lack of alternative means of subsistence.   
 
Stiglitz (1998a) provides some estimates of the increase in the incidence of 
absolute poverty as growth slows down in the affected countries.  On the basis of zero 
growth and unchanging income distribution, he calculates that the poverty rates in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand will worsen by the year 2000 but only 
by a few percentage points.  He suggests that this will not reverse the gains made 
during the last five years. However, still assuming a zero growth rate but a worsening 
distribution of income, the worst case assumption of past experience indicates a 
substantial increase in poverty.  But this increase in poverty will still not be sufficient 
to reverse the reduction in poverty of the last decade.  It should be noted, however, 
that the Stiglitz estimates do not take into account the effects of any rise in the 
inflation rate which may follow from the crisis.   
 
Very importantly, a major cause for concern in several East and South East 
Asian countries today is the prospect of ethnic violence. The minority Chinese 
community, which is often wealthy and the backbone of  business in many of these 
countries, could become the victim of such violence as economic conditions 
deteriorate.  Apart from its political consequences, such ethnic strife could destroy the 
entire fabric of economic development in the region.  One important reason for East 
Asia’s economic success has precisely been the capacity of the political system in 
these countries to be able to harness the wealth and the expertise of the Chinese 
community for economic development.  The task of political leaders in the affected 
countries to maintain ethnic peace would become much more difficult as a 
consequence of economic decline. 
 
VII.2  Duration and Long-Term Affects of the Crisis: Lessons from Latin 
America 
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The foregoing analysis, particularly of unemployment and poverty, has been based on 
the assumption that after a short period of reduced growth the economies of the 
affected countries will return to their previous long-term trend rates.  This assumption 
may not, however, be realistic.  Turning, therefore, to the crucial question of how long 
it might take to recover from the crisis, and what would be the social consequences if 
the crisis  is a prolonged one, it is useful to examine in more detail the Latin American 
experience.  In the last 15 years countries in the region experienced a major debt crisis 
and more recently many were faced by a huge financial crisis.  Following the onset of 
the debt crisis in Mexico in 1982, and its spread by contagion to other Latin American 
economies, most countries adopted IMF programmes at some point. These 
programmes - as is also presently envisaged in the case of Asian countries -  were 
intended to administer a short sharp shock which would lead to a speedy resumption 
of economic growth. This, however, did not happen.  Nor did the heterodox policies 
followed by some governments succeed in achieving sustained economic growth with 
low inflation.  Throughout much of the 1980s the Latin American countries were 
severely credit rationed by the international banks, and the result was a decade in 
which they experienced no growth and often hyper-inflation. 
 
Following the introduction of Brady bonds and the implementation of neo-
liberal “Washington consensus” policies, international capital flows to the region 
resumed towards the end of the 1980s.  This led to a resumption of economic growth 
in the 1990s. But it is important to note that these countries have still not reached the 
previous trend rates of economic growth experienced before the debt crisis. 
 
With regard to the social impact of the crisis, Tokman (1997) has 
systematically analysed the effects of changes in the pattern of economic growth and 
inflation in Latin America since the beginning of the debt crisis in the early 1980s to 
the mid 1990s on unemployment, income distribution and poverty.  His main 
conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  Economic growth, rather than labour market conditions, is the main 
determinant of changes in employment levels, particularly in the formal sector.  
The overall elasticity of employment with respect to output was found to be of 
the order of 0.8.  (In other words, a 1 per cent increase in production leads to a 
0.8 per cent increase in employment.)  However, between 1980 and the early 
1990s, eight of each ten new jobs occurred in the informal sector.  Informal 
sector employment in the non-agricultural sector as a percentage of total non-
agricultural employment rose from 40 per cent in 1980 to a massive 55 per 
cent by 1995. 
 
2.  As a consequence of this “informalisation” of the economy, the increase in 
open unemployment rates was not large.  Nevertheless, open unemployment 
among youth reached 20 per cent. 
 
3.  Real wages in manufacturing fell by 14 per cent between 1980 and 1990, 
and even by 1995 were still 4 per cent below their 1980 level.  In 1995, the 
minimum real wage was still 30 per cent below its 1980 level. 
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4.  The percentage of households living below the poverty line rose from 35 
per cent to 39 per cent between 1980 and 1990, whereas prior to the crisis 
poverty had been declining. 
 
5.  Income distribution is not only very unequal in Latin America, inequalities 
greatly increased during the period of adjustment.
23
  
 
Returning to the question of how long the crisis may last, which is critical to an 
analysis of its social consequences, a discussion of the experience of Mexico in some 
detail is helpful.  This is for two reasons.  First, Mexico has been the Fund’s star pupil 
in the region since the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, in the sense that it has most 
faithfully followed the Fund’s policy advice.  Secondly, Mexico’s experience in 
overcoming the more recent “tequila” crisis of 1994/5 is often held up as a model for 
affected Asian countries to follow. 
 
As in the case of Latin America as a whole, Mexico’s record over the long 
period 1982-1997 does not provide much encouragement for Asian countries.  In 
1997, for the first time in 15 years, Mexico recorded a rate of growth of 7 per cent 
which is broadly in the region of its long-term growth rate of 6 per cent a year prior to 
the debt crisis. Even if this higher growth rate were to persist in the future, the country 
would have taken 15 years to recover its long-term growth trajectory (Singh 1997a; 
Ros 1997).  However, various projections for the Mexican economy show its growth 
rate falling to 5 per cent in 1998 and to 4 per cent in 1999, whilst the current account 
deficit is projected to increase to US$ 7.3 billion from 1997 to US$ 13.4 billion in 
1998, to US$ 16.4 billion in 1999. (The Financial Times, 12 March 1998) 
 
Following the debt crisis, between 1982 and 1990, the Mexican economy did 
not grow at all. With the resumption of capital inflows, growth started again but the 
average growth rate between 1990 and 1996 was only 2 per cent. This is despite the 
fact that Mexico attracted huge net capital inflows amounting to US$ 91 billion in the 
period 1990 to 1993 -- one fifth of all such inflows to developing countries.  From 
1992 to 1994, annual capital inflows to Mexico averaged 8 per cent of GDP, 
compared with 5 per cent of GDP in the previous peak period 1977 to 1981.  As 
argued in detail in Singh and Weiss (1998), these massive capital inflows were not 
based on the performance of Mexico’s fundamentals but on the euphoria generated by 
Mexico’s membership of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 
 
The steep devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 which triggered 
the “tequila” crisis caused the country to suffer a sharp but, fortunately in this case, 
brief economic reversal.  In 1995, Mexico experienced a 15 per cent fall in aggregate 
demand, 26 per cent fall in investment  and 7 per cent in GDP.  However, following 
the interruption in international capital flows in 1995, capital flows resumed in 1996.  
In 1997, the country received a record US$ 12.1 billion in foreign direct investment.  
The Financial Times, in its recent review Latin American Finance (12 March 1998, p. 
5) sums up Mexico’s central economic problem as follows:  “The economy needs to 
grow at 6 per cent a year to keep its young expanding population employed.  The 
country lacks sufficient internal savings to finance such internal growth.  So it 
                                                          
23
 On this subject there are important contributions by Fishlow (1997) and Morley (1995). 
 23 
borrows capital from abroad, which creates a balance of payments shortfall, which in 
turn exposes Mexico to periodic financial crises when foreign investors pull the plug.” 
 
It is generally agreed that an important underlying cause of the huge balance of 
payments deficits in Mexico prior to the 1994 “tequila” crisis was overconsumption.  
In the wake of financial liberalisation, consumers went on a spending spree, with the 
result that Mexico’s private savings fell from 15 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 5 per cent 
in 1994. 
 
In contrast to the Mexican financial crisis of 1994, the present financial crisis 
in Asia has not been caused by a shortage or fall in domestic savings.  All the affected 
countries have, as seen earlier, very high domestic savings rates.  The large current 
account deficit in Thailand, for example, was not due to low savings.  In 1996 
Thailand’s domestic saving rate was a huge 33 per cent of GDP, but its investment 
rate was even higher a little over 40 per cent of GDP (see Table 3).  To the extent that 
a significant part of this investment is thought to have been allocated to 
“unproductive” uses such as real estate, the Thai crisis may be regarded as one of 
overinvestment. 
 
There are good reasons to believe that Thailand’s crisis of overinvestment may 
be more difficult and take longer to unravel than would a crisis of overconsumption
24
.  
This is due to the massive indebtedness of both the non-financial corporate sector and 
of the financial institutions. Technically, by western accounting standards, many of 
these corporations and banks may be bankrupt as a result of the enormous currency 
depreciation, the huge rise in real interest rates and the collapse in property prices. The 
experience of banking crises in other countries suggests that the restructuring of the 
balance sheets of banks and corporations is usually a protracted process even in the 
best of circumstances.
25
  
 
 
VIII.  Analytical Conclusions and Policy Implications 
VIII. 1  Analytical conclusions 
The main analytical arguments of this paper may be summarised as follows.  Firstly, 
the current widely held and highly influential thesis that the  root cause of the present 
financial crisis in South East and East Asian countries lies in the dirigiste model of 
Asian capitalism pursued by  these countries is seriously mistaken. The analysis of the 
paper suggests that the fundamental reason for the crisis is to be found not in too 
much, but rather in too little government control over the financial liberalisation 
process which these countries implemented in the recent period. 
 
Secondly, in view of the rather different circumstances of the Asian countries 
(compared with the kinds of countries that usually face financial difficulties), the IFIs  
appear to have misdiagnosed the crisis. They have therefore proposed inappropriate 
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remedies (for example, further financial liberalisation, large fiscal austerity, a steep 
rise in real interest rates) which are likely to deepen the crisis. Moreover, market 
confidence, which was of critical importance in the evolution of the crisis, is unlikely 
to have been helped by these institutions’ emphasis on the ostensible fundamental 
structural weaknesses of these countries and requirement that they should implement 
far-reaching reforms in their economic and social systems. All these factors 
contributed to turning what was essentially a liquidity problem into one of solvency. 
 
Thirdly, as explained in the previous sections, the governments of the affected 
countries made serious errors by not controlling the financial liberalisation process. 
Although it is true that the IMF as well as the U.S. government have been urging 
capital account liberalisation for these countries, it is also the case that a growing 
domestic constituency also supported such liberalisation. Thus, for example, prior to 
the crisis, Thailand and Malaysia were vying with one another as well as with Hong 
Kong and Singapore to assume the role of regional financial centre.  This necessarily 
entailed considerable financial liberalisation. In the euphoria accompanying the large 
inflows of capital during the 1980s and 1990s, the benefits of  becoming a regional 
financial centre were readily seen, (the development of the financial services industry, 
skilled employment etc.).  However, the governments seemed oblivious to the 
potential costs.
26
  
 
In addition to the pursuit of financial liberalisation without proper institutional 
controls, the governments of some of the crisis countries (particularly Thailand) might 
also have made some macroeconomic mistakes, for example, not adjusting the 
exchange rate, relying on short-term capital to finance a large current account deficit.  
Nevertheless, a central argument of this paper is that, although these government 
policy errors may have initiated the crisis, this was compounded by  other factors: the 
lack of co-ordination between banks and the desire of each bank not to renew its 
short-term loans following the crisis of confidence;  the herd behaviour of 
international investors which was partly responsible for the “contagion” throughout 
the region; and, as suggested above, the inappropriate policy response from the IFIs to 
the confidence crisis.   
 
VIII.2  Policy implications 
What are the policy implications of these conclusions?  The basic policy issues which 
are closely interlinked are as follows: 
 
1) How to restore investor confidence so that normal capital flows in the 
region are resumed; 
 
2) How to ensure that long-term growth in the real economy is restored as 
quickly as possible; and 
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3) How to provide immediate assistance to the millions of people who are 
likely to become unemployed or pushed back into poverty once again. 
 
The importance of the last issue cannot be exaggerated. This is not just for 
humanitarian reasons but, as indicated in the previous section, it is also necessary for 
maintaining social peace. To provide such assistance effectively and on an adequate 
scale will require not only considerable imagination but also a large expansion in 
government activity and often direct intervention in the market processes.  Such 
emergency safety net programmes may include selective subsidies, food for work 
schemes and public works projects, including the kind of labour intensive 
infrastructural projects which the ILO has pioneered in developing countries of Asia 
and Africa.
27
 How to pay for these measures within the limits of fiscal prudence, let 
alone within the IMF fiscal austerity programmes, will be a major issue of political 
economy for these countries. 
 
Turning to the first policy issue, the most important requirement for achieving 
a resumption of normal capital flows to the affected countries are economic policies 
which are credible and have wide domestic political support.  Such credibility is much 
more likely to be achieved if there is political unity in the country and if there is close 
co-operation not only between government and business but also labour and civil 
society organisations in a national programme to resolve the economic situation.  This 
would inevitably mean that the burden of adjustment would need to be equitably 
shared by all sections of society.  Thus, the traditional Asian model of capitalism 
essentially based on corporatism becomes all the more essential if the present acute 
economic crisis is to be overcome. 
 
The first best approach to resolving the present crisis of confidence is for the 
IMF and the affected countries to co-operate closely on the essential and immediate 
narrow task of restoring their access to the international capital markets. For this 
purpose, the IMF should act as an intermediary between the international banks and 
other major creditors on the one side and the private sector debtors on the other, in 
order to achieve a rapid restructuring of the debt.  In this role, the institution needs to 
reiterate to investors and creditors the healthy fundamentals of these countries, their 
proven strong supply-side potential, their export orientation and therefore their ability 
in the medium to long term to service their debts.  It is significant and most 
encouraging that in response to the criticism of its policy programmes, the IMF has 
already made some important changes such as softening the strong demand restraint 
measures required of Thailand and Korea.  Although somewhat late in the day (rather 
than before the crisis began) the Fund has also been participating in discussions to 
facilitate the re-scheduling of the debts. 
 
VIII.3  Policy implications for the ILO 
The analysis of this paper has important policy implications for the ILO. The ILO’s 
traditional policy concerns relate, among other things, to employment, wages and 
conditions of work of employees, and poverty reduction. For these objectives to be 
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met on a sustained basis requires a country to have steady and fast long-term 
economic growth.
28
 If there is an interruption to the process, for whatever reason, it 
should be as brief as possible with as little loss of output and employment as possible 
in the adjustment period. The ILO has a difficult task in the present crisis in the 
affected countries. The first important point is that it should act independently, and be 
seen to be doing so in pursuit of its own objectives. For this purpose, it is essential for 
the organisation to develop its own analysis of the crisis rather than simply accepting 
others’ view of it. 
 
Secondly, the ILO needs to make a clear distinction between policies which 
would be helpful in the short-term and those which might be required in the long-
term. The kind of policies which would be appropriate in the short-term have been 
indicated above. Although these policies would involve considerable government 
intervention in the market processes they are relatively uncontroversial. There is a 
growing international consensus concerning the need for swift public measures to 
cope with the effects of fluctuations in economic activity in the context of a globalized 
liberal international economy. 
 
However, there are more difficult issues for the ILO to consider with respect to 
safety net policies for the long-term. Does the organisation support, for example, the 
traditional Asian model of lifetime employment or does it think that, even if feasible, 
such a model is not appropriate and should be replaced by flexible labour markets on 
the U.S.-U.K. pattern. Similarly, the organisation would need to define its approach to 
pension systems and social security in these countries. Thus, taking into account 
economic as well as social factors (economic efficiency, savings and growth potential, 
social solidarity and poverty avoidance), should these counties institute the traditional 
European type of pay-as-you-go state pension system, or a privatised pension system, 
as increasingly advocated by the World Bank and IMF? If it were the latter should it 
be, for example, the Singapore model or the Chilean model? The ILO will be expected 
to advise on these questions as the affected countries, sooner or later, return to their 
normal long-term growth trajectory. 
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